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Abstract
Although government transfer is a well-known fiscal variable, it can significantly influence
the overall supply of money in the economy. Beneficiaries of government transfer program
will consume a portion of it while the rest is saved and these initial savings will then be
amplified inside the economy through the multiplier effect. Apart from consumption and
savings a portion of government transfer will return to government in the form of taxes.
Here, in the first place, we intuitively calculate the contribution of government transfer
on private consumption, households’ savings, government tax revenue and money supply.
In the next step we provide a microfoundation for our intuitive reasoning using a simple
endowment economy with finitely lived households. Finally, we empirically calculate
our proposed multipliers using impulse response analysis under structural panel VAR
framework. Response of money supply to changes in government transfer uncovers a
channel through which monetary and fiscal policy may interact. Moreover, variance
decomposition of money supply indicates that a significant portion of variance in money
supply can be explained in terms of government transfer under structural panel VAR
framework.
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1 Introduction 1
Milton Friedman once argued that although the monetary policy can not permanently 2
influence real output and unemployment it has a substantial impact on general price 3
level [13]. However, the role of monetary policy to stabilize the general price level has 4
been challenged several times. Most notably, Sargent and Wallace in their seminal paper 5
titled Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic show that a contractionary monetary policy 6
may lead to higher inflation in near future during the periods of fiscal dominance [26]. 7
So, in order to perform its designated role of stabilizing the general price level monetary 8
policy needs to interact with the fiscal one. Since then the interaction between the 9
monetary and the fiscal policy has become a central topic in monetary economics. A 10
whole bunch of papers is dedicated to the investigation of whether and to what extent 11
the unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace works. A brief description 12
of the literature since unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is sketched below. 13
Allan Drazen (1985) [9] shows that temporary monetary tightening will eventually lead 14
to higher inflation when the deficit is fixed only if the elasticity of money demand with 15
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respect to the money growth rate is less than unity. Bhattacharya and Kudoh (2002) [3] 16
shows that unpleasant monetarist arithmetic holds even when the real interest rate is 17
well below the growth rate of the economy. Alan S. Blinder (1982) [5] uses the traditional 18
targets-instruments approach to assess the potential gains from greater coordination 19
between monetary and fiscal policies. Since greater coordination is often associated with 20
looser money and tighter fiscal policy two different models of the economy are used 21
to gauge the quantitative importance of the policy mix. Guido Tabellini (1986) [30] 22
analyzes a dynamic linear-quadratic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities 23
and shows that coordination between monetary and fiscal policies takes the steady state 24
value of public debt closer to the desired target. Beetsema and Bovenberg (1999) [1] 25
explores how debt accumulation is affected by the strategic interplay between monetary 26
and fiscal authorities. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) [8] shows that if monetary policy is 27
more conservative than the fiscal one then the coordination between the two policies 28
entails a smaller output and a higher inflation which neither authorities would like to 29
have. 30
On the other hand, formation of monetary union in different jurisdictions and 31
enhanced independence of the central banks in the formulation of the monetary policy 32
give researchers new grounds to explore and investigate more on the coordination between 33
the two policies. How monetary and fiscal policy interact inside a monetary union has 34
become an active area of research after the formation of the Economic and Monetary 35
Union (EMU) and a whole bunch of literature is dedicated to the investigation of this 36
newly flourishing field. For example, Jordi Galli et al. (2003) [14] has shown that 37
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have minimal but not 38
substantial role on the government of EMU countries trying to stabilize their economy 39
through an effective fiscal policy. Beetsma and Bovenberg (2005) [2] argues that the 40
conflict between ECB and fiscal authorities inside EMU is specially harmful if labor- 41
market rigidities and high distortionary taxes give rise to widespread unemployment, if 42
ECB pursues tight monetary policy aimed at price stability and if nominal wage contracts 43
are rigid so that the fiscal policy is set more frequently than nominal wage contracts 44
are. Tatiana Kirsanova et el. (2007) [19] uses a microfounded New Keynesian model 45
of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian 46
consumers and derives optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. 47
Meanwhile, Sims (2016) [29] argues that during periods of rapid inflations or long 48
periods of very low inflation and interest rates coordination of fiscal and monetary 49
policy is necessary. Hommes et al. (2019) [17] explains why monetary policy alone is 50
not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when 51
inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal 52
switching rule can successfully escape episodes of liquidity trap. 53
Moreover, another strand of research tends to evolve around the fiscal theory of the 54
determination of price level (FTPL) gradually introduced by Leeper (1991) [21], Sims 55
(1994) [28], Woodford (1995) [31]. FTPL attempts to say that price level determination 56
is not the monopoly of the monetary policy. Rather, the fiscal policy has a lot to say 57
regarding this. According to the fiscal theory of price level determination, for the price 58
level to remain stable, the government debt must be sustainable, i.e., the government 59
must not run a structural deficit. Since its inception back in 1990s, a whole bunch of 60
literature has been developed around the verification, appropriateness and applicabilities 61
of the propositions of FTPL. Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) [20] argues that fiscal policy 62
can affect inflation if and only if the government uses non-Ricardian policies. Buiter 63
(2002) [6] argues that The FTPL confuses two key building blocks of a model of a market 64
economy: budget constraints which must be satisfied identically and market clearing or 65
equilibrium conditions. The FTPL asssumes that the government’s intertemporal budget 66
constraint needs to be satisfied only in equilibrium. According to McCallum and Nelson 67
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(2005) [22] the FTPL attains prominence only because it appears to provide a theory 68
whose implications differ greatly from conventional monetary analysis. Sims (2016) [29] 69
argues fiscal expansion can replace ineffective monetary policy at the zero lower bound. 70
Orphanides (2018) [25] explains why monetary policy has fiscal implications that are 71
especially pronounced at the zero lower bound. 72
None of the above literature considers the role of government transfer in the money 73
creation process through successive consumption and savings. Nor they attempt to 74
show the direct algebraic link through which government transfer and money supply are 75
inter-related. Here, in the first place, we intuitively quantify the impact of government 76
transfer on total consumption, savings, money supply and taxes. Next we provide a 77
microfoundation of our arguments using a simple endowment economy with finitely lived 78
households. Once we are done with the microfoundation we fit in the consumption, 79
savings, taxes, transfers and money supply data of some 10 (ten) OECD countries into a 80
structural panel VAR framework in order to capture the dynamic response of money 81
supply to changes in government transfer. Next, we resort to variance decomposition 82
to unveil how much variance in money supply is attributed to government transfer as 83
well as other endogenous variables in the system. The rest of the article is organized 84
as follows: Section: 2 describes the inter-relation between government transfer and 85
private consumption, gross savings, taxes and money supply in a rather intuitive fashion 86
while Section: 3 provides its microfoundation in the context of a small endowment 87
economy. Section: 4 formally defines different kinds of impact and cumulative multipliers 88
introduced thematically in Section: 2 and 3 for the purpose of empirical estimation. 89
Section: 5 narrates the methodology used for empirical estimation. Section: 6 presents 90
the results of empirical analysis. Section: 7 presents a general discussion about how and 91
where our work fits into the existing body of knowledge as well as its main contribution 92
and finally section: 8 concludes the article. 93
2 Intuitive Reasoning Regarding the Interaction Be- 94
tween Transfers, Taxes, Consumption, Savings and 95
Money Supply 96
To start our analysis let us assume that marginal propensity to consume and marginal 97
tax Rate of the economy under consideration be given by MPC and MTR respectively 98
where 0 ≤ MPC,MTR ≤ 1. Let us also assume that consumption, savings, tax and 99
disposable income be given by C, S, T and DI respectively and they are subscripted by 100
i, i ∈ N to indicate the quantity at any arbitrary period i. 101
102
Now, if the government intends to stimulate the economy by a fiscal stimulus ∆G in 103
the form of transfers and subsidies then a portion of ∆G will return to the government 104
in the form of tax revenue, another portion will be consumed by the households while 105
the rest will be saved. Thus changing the extent of government transfer is supposed 106
to have an effect on household consumption, gross savings and tax revenue: When the 107
government transfer increases so do the private consumption, gross savings and tax 108
revenue and also the vice versa. Then the amount of tax revenue (T1), disposable income 109
(DI1), consumption (C1) and savings (S1) induced by the initial government transfer 110
∆G during the first period of our analysis will be given by the following constructs. 111
T1 = MTR×∆G
DI1 = (1−MTR)×∆G
C1 = MPC × (1−MTR)×∆G = P ×∆G
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S1 = (1−MPC)× (1−MTR)×∆G = Q×∆G
where P = MPC × (1−MTR) and Q = (1−MPC)× (1−MTR). Money spent 112
in consumption namely P ×∆G will be received by the seller of the goods and services 113
who receives it as income and in turn, consumes a portion of it, pays another portion as 114
taxes and saves the rest. These second levels of taxes (T2), disposable income (DI2), 115
consumption (C2) and savings (S2) induced from the initial government transfer ∆G 116
are given by the following. 117
T2 = MTR× P ×∆G
DI2 = (1−MTR)× P ×∆G
C2 = MPC × (1−MTR)× P ×∆G = P
2 ×∆G
S2 = (1−MPC)× (1−MTR)× P ×∆G = Q× P ×∆G
Like before money spent in consumption in the second step namely P 2 ×∆G will 118
be received by the seller of goods and services as revenue. Following the same logic as 119
applied before a portion of this revenue is taxed, a portion is consumed while the rest 120
will be saved. So, the amount of taxes collected (T3), disposable income received (DI3), 121
consumption (C3) and savings (S3) made during this step will be given by the following. 122
T3 = MTR× P
2 ×∆G
DI3 = (1−MTR)× P
2 ×∆G
C3 = MPC × (1−MTR)× P
2 ×∆G = P 3 ×∆G
S3 = (1−MPC)× (1−MTR)× P
2 ×∆G = Q× P 2 ×∆G
The above process of successive consumption, savings and taxation will not continue 123
indefinitely during a given period due to the finite velocity of money. Cumulative impact 124
of government transfer on consumption, savings, money supply and taxation in a given 125
year will partly depend upon this finite velocity of money. When the velocity of money 126
increases ceteris paribus more and more transactions take place and with every new 127
transaction the impulse of initial government transfer is felt one more time. If the 128
velocity of money is given by v then the total amount of taxation induced by the initial 129
government transfer ∆G will be given by: 130
T = T1 + T2 + T3 + ....+ Tv−1
= MTR×∆G+MTR× P ×∆G+MTR× P 2 ×∆G+ .......+MTR× P v−2 ×∆G
= MTR×∆G× [1 + P + P 2 + P 3 + .....+ P v−2]
= MTR×∆G×
1− P v−1
1− P
In the above expression we have calculated the summation of first (v − 1) terms of 131
the series instead of v because money changes hand for the first time when government 132
makes its initial transfer ∆G and this trasaction exhausts money velocity by 1 (one). 133
So, the total amount of taxes induced by the initial government transfer ∆G is given by: 134
T = MTR×∆G×
1− P v−1
1− P
(1)
Similarly, total amount of consumption induced by the initial government transfer is 135
given by: 136
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C = C1 + C2 + C3 + ....+ Cv−1
= P ×∆G+ P 2 ×∆G+ P 3 ×∆G+ ......+ P v−1 ×∆G
= ∆G× [P + P 2 + P 3 + ........+ P v−1]
= ∆G× P ×
1− P v−1
1− P
So, aggregate amount of consumption induced by the initial government transfer is 137
given by the following equation: 138
C = ∆G× P ×
1− P v−1
1− P
(2)
Applying the same logic we can calculate the total increase in gross savings brought 139
about by the initial government transfer ∆G: 140
S = S1 + S2 + S3 + ....+ Sv−1
= Q×∆G+Q× P ×∆G+Q× P 2 ×∆G+ .....+Q× P v−2 ×∆G
= Q×∆G×
1− P v−1
1− P
So, change in gross savings brought about by the initial government transfer ∆G is 141
given by the following equality: 142
S = Q×∆G×
1− P v−1
1− P
(3)
These savings will enter into the banking system and the bank, after maintaining 143
adequate reserve (here we assume the banks are operating under a fractional reserve 144
banking system and are supposed to keep a certain portion of its total demand and time 145
liabilities as reserve), will lend out the rest of the amount. The borrowers of the fund 146
will then deposit a portion of the borrowed fund with another bank. This new deposit 147
receiving bank like its predecessor bank will keep a fraction of its deposits as reserve and 148
lends out the rest and the process of money creation continues. Unlike the conventional 149
approach of calculating money multiplier which mistakenly assumes money changes 150
an infinite number of hands during a given period here we take the finite velocity of 151
money into account. So, the extent of money created in the process will depend upon 152
the time at which the savings are created. The earlier the savings are made the more 153
impact it will have on the money creation process. So, the savings made at period i 154
will create relatively more money (by money we mean demand and time deposits of 155
varying maturity) than that of the savings made at period (i+ k), i+ k ∈ N, k > 0. If 156
the reserve ratio of the bank is given by RR then money created by the savings S1 is 157
given by the following: 158
D1 = Q×∆G+ (1−RR)×Q×∆G+ (1−RR)
2 ×Q×∆G+ ...+ (1−RR)
v
2−1 ×Q×∆G
= Q×∆G× [1 + (1−RR) + (1−RR)2 + ...+ (1−RR)
v
2−1]
= Q×∆G×
1− (1−RR)
v
2
RR
In the derivation of the above equation we consider three different types of transactions 159
each of which exhausts the money velocity by 1. 160
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• The saver will bring the savings, say x to the bank to create a demand or a time 161
deposit. 162
• The bank will keep RR× x as regulatory reserve and lends out the rest. 163
• The borrower will keep the borrowed amount (1 − RR) × x into another bank 164
account which in turn creates more deposit for the banks as a whole. 165
Similarly, the amount of money created by the savings S2 is given by the following: 166
D2 = Q× P ×∆G× [1 + (1−RR) + (1−RR)
2 + .....+ (1−RR)
v−1
2 −1]
= Q× P ×∆G×
1− (1−RR)
v−1
2
RR
Proceeding in the same manner, ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ (v − 1), we can calculate the amount of 167
deposit Di created by Si: 168
Di = Q× P
i−1 ×∆G×
1− (1−RR)
v−(i−1)
2
RR
So, the total amount of deposit (D) created by the initial government transfer ∆G 169
will be given by the following: 170
D =
v−1
∑
1=1
Di =
v−1
∑
i=1
Q× P i−1 ×∆G×
1− (1−RR)
v−(i−1)
2
RR
(4)
3 Microfoundations 171
We start with the case of an endowment economy where the households receive some 172
endowment Yi at period i, ∀1≤i,≤n where n indicates the total life span of the households. 173
In addition to that households are also entitled to Ti amount of government transfer 174
at period i. Households living through these n periods seek to maximize their lifetime 175
utility over these n periods by optimally splitting their periodic endowments and transfer 176
payments into consumption and savings. Savings made at period i is entitled to interest 177
payment at the rate ri+k in period (i+ k), ∀i+k≤n. Moreover, let us also assume that 178
government imposes a distortionary tax on households’ consumption which is collected 179
at TC% of consumption amount. Under the above circumstances households’ budget 180
contraint at the last period of its time span must satisfy the following equality: 181
(1 + TC)× Cn = Yn + Tn +
n−1
∑
i=1
(Yi + Ti − (1 + TC)× Ci)×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)
where
∑n−1
i=1 (Yi + Ti − (1 + TC)× Ci)×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj) is households’ accumulated 182
savings with interest there on up to period n. In descriptive term the above constraint 183
implies that the households need to eat up their entire endowment Yn and transfer Tn 184
at period n in addition to any accumulated savings and interest there on in order to 185
maximize their overall life time utility through consumption. As n-th year is presumably 186
the households’ last year of existence they need to consume it all for anything left 187
unconsumed after period n will be of no effect towards households’ objective of life 188
time utility maximization. Hence, the equality sign follows in the households’ budget 189
constraint instead of an inequality. Simple rearranging of households’ life time budget 190
constraint entails the following: 191
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n
∑
i=1
(1 + TC)× Ci ×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj) =
n
∑
i=1
(Yi + Ti)×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)
Let us assume that the households’ life time utility function is given by the following: 192
U(C) =
n
∑
i=1
βi−1 ×
C1−σi
1− σ
where β is the discounting factor and σ is the coefficient of Constant Relative Risk 193
Aversion (CRRA). So, the households’ optimization problem takes the following form: 194
Max
n
∑
i=1
βi−1 ×
C1−σi
1− σ
S.T.
n
∑
i=1
(1 + TC)× Ci ×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)−
n
∑
i=1
(Yi + Ti)×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj) = 0
Taking the Lagrangian of the above maximization problem yields: 195
L =
n
∑
i=1
βi−1×
C1−σi
1− σ
−λ×


n
∑
i=1
(1 + TC)× Ci ×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)−
n
∑
i=1
(Yi + Ti)×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)


Taking the first order partial derivative of the above Lagrangian with respect to Ci 196
and setting it to zero as first order optimality condition yields the following expression 197
for Ci. 198
Ci = λ
− 1
σ ×
[
(1 + TC)×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
βi−1
]− 1
σ
(5)
Now taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to λ and setting it to zero 199
as an another FOC yields the following (what we yield here is inevitably the households’ 200
life time budget constraint). 201
n
∑
i=1
(1 + TC)× Ci ×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj) =
n
∑
i=1
(Yi + Ti)×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)
Substituting the value of Ci from Equation: 5 into the above expression yields: 202
n
∑
i=1
(1+TC)×λ−
1
σ ×
[
(1 + TC)×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
βi−1
]− 1
σ
×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1+rj) =
n
∑
i=1
(Yi+Ti)×
n
∏
j=i+1
(1+rj)
Simplifying the above equation and solving for λ yields: 203
λ =



∑n
i=1(Yi + Ti)×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
∑n
i=1(1 + TC)×
[
(1+TC)×
∏
n
j=i+1(1+rj)
βi−1
]−1/σ
×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)



−σ
Substituting the above value of λ into Equation: 5 we can get an exact expression 204
for optimal consumption sequence Ci: 205
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Ci =



∑n
i=1(Yi + Ti)×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
(1 + TC)×
∑n
i=1
[
∏
n
j=i+1(1+rj)
βi−1
]−1/σ
×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)



×
[
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
βi−1
]−1/σ
(6)
Now that we have an exact representation of optimal consumption sequence we 206
are in the position to estimate different kinds of multipliers algebraically that we have 207
intuitively discussed about in the previous section. 208
• Consumption Multiplier: Consumption multiplier is defined as the change in 209
household consumption brought about by a unit change in government transfer. So, 210
to estimate algebraically the consumption multiplier we should take partial derivative 211
of optimal consumption sequence Ci with respect to government transfer Ti at period 212
i. Taking the partial derivate of Ci with respect to Ti yields the following expression 213
for consumption multiplier. 214
∂Ci
∂Ti
=



∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
(1 + TC)×
∑n
i=1
[
∏
n
j=i+1(1+rj)
βi−1
]−1/σ
×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)



[
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
βi−1
]−1/σ
(7)
• Tax Multiplier: As the government imposes distortionary taxes on consumption a 215
part of the government transfer to households will eventually return to the government 216
as part of the tax revenue. Let the total amount of tax collected by the government 217
up to period k be given by τk. So, 218
τk =
k
∑
i=1
TC × Ci = TC ×
k
∑
i=1
Ci
Tax multiplier is therefore defined to be the amount of changes in tax revenue brought 219
about by a unit change in government transfer. In order to estimate tax multiplier we 220
need to take the first order partial derivate of tax revenue collected by the government 221
up to an arbitrary period k, ∀1≤k≤n with respect to the government transfer at another 222
arbitrary period i, ∀1≤i≤n. Hence we get the following as an algebraic representation 223
of the said tax multiplier. 224
∂τk
∂Ti
= TC ×
k
∑
i=1
∂Ci
∂Ti
Substituting the value of ∂Ci∂Ti from Equation: 7 we get the following representation for 225
our proposed tax multiplier. 226
∂τk
∂Ti
= TC×
k
∑
i=1



∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
(1 + TC)×
∑n
i=1
[
∏
n
j=i+1(1+rj)
βi−1
]
−1/σ
×
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)



[
∏n
j=i+1(1 + rj)
βi−1
]
−1/σ
(8)
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• Savings Multiplier: Apart from influencing consumption and tax revenue govern- 227
ment transfer is also supposed to have an impact on households’ savings. It is perhaps 228
due to the fact that the households will not spend the whole portion of government 229
transfer in present consumption. Rather depending upon the anticipated future rate of 230
interest they tend to save a portion of it. Thus a change in government transfer should 231
be followed by a change in households’ savings as well and the savings multiplier 232
is defined to be the change brought about in households’ savings in response to a 233
unit change in government transfer. Households’ savings at period k, ∀1≤k≤n can be 234
defined as follows: 235
Sk =
k
∑
i=1
[Yi + Ti − (1 + TC)× Ci]×
k
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)
Taking the first order partial derivate of Sk with respect to government transfer Ti at 236
period i, ∀1≤i≤n we can get an algebraic expression for households’ savings multiplier: 237
∂Sk
∂Ti
=
k
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj)− (1 + TC)×
k
∑
i=1
∂Ci
∂Ti
×
k
∏
j=i+1
(1 + rj) (9)
Substituting the value of ∂Ci∂Ti from Equation: 7 we get the precise representation for 238
∂Sk
∂Ti
. 239
• Money Supply Multiplier: In the previous section we have described how house- 240
holds’ savings behavior can be effected by the government transfer. As households’ 241
savings are effected by government transfer so will be the money supply. This is 242
because money supply which is essentially the summation of different kinds of demand 243
and time deposits along with the currency in circulation is partly defined by the 244
households’ savings tendency: the larger the households’ gross savings ceteris paribus 245
larger will be the money supply. Apart from households’ savings money supply tends 246
to depend upon the reserve requirement under fractional reserve banking system and 247
also on the velocity of money. When the reserve ratio is increased banks’ ability to 248
extend loans shrinks and the vice versa. On the other hand, if the money velocity 249
increases banks can quickly convert their loanable funds into loans. Loans thus created 250
will induce further deposits through the money creation and the process continues. 251
For the sake of present analysis let us assume that the reserve ratio be given by RR 252
and the velocity of money in a period be given by v. Like before we consider three 253
different kinds of transactions that take place through the money creation process. In 254
the first transaction households deposit the money with the bank. In the second step 255
banks keep a fraction of the deposited amount as reserve and lend out the rest. In the 256
third step the borrowers inject their borrowed fund into another bank account before 257
they start to spend it all and thereby create more loanable funds for the banks. When 258
the borrowers inject their borrowed fund into a bank account a cycle of the money 259
creation process ends while an exact similar one begins. Each of the above three 260
types of transactions exhausts money velocity by 1(one). Under the above simplyfying 261
assumptions savings created at period i will change [k − (i− 1)]× v number of hands 262
up to period k. So, the amount of money Di (here money implies demand and/or 263
time deposits) created by the savings Si is given by the sum of the following series: 264
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Di = Si ×
[
1 + (1−RR) + (1−RR)2 + .......+ (1−RR)
[k−(i−1)×v]−1
2
]
= Si ×
[
1− (1−RR)
[k−(i−1)×v]+1
2
RR
]
So, the total amount of money created up to period k will be given by the following 265
construct: 266
MSk =
k
∑
i=1
Di
=
k
∑
i=1
Si ×
[
1− (1−RR)
[k−(i−1)×v]+1
2
RR
]
Taking the first order partial derivative of MSk with respect to Ti we will get our 267
desired money supply multiplier. 268
∂MSk
∂Ti
=
k
∑
i=1
[
1− (1−RR)
[k−(i−1)×v]+1
2
RR
]
×
∂Si
∂Ti
(10)
Substituting the value of ∂Si∂Ti , ∀1≤i≤k from Equation: 9 we can get a precise expression 269
for our proposed money supply multiplier ∂MSk∂Ti . 270
4 Formal Definitions of Multipliers for the Purpose 271
of Empirical Estimation 272
In the previous sections we have provided the intuitive reasoning for different kinds 273
of multipliers to exist in the first place (Equation: 1 to 4) and also provided the 274
microfoundation against our first hand intuitive arguments (Equation: 7 to 10). From 275
the above discussion it is evident that if the government transfer changes by an amount 276
∆G then in response tax revenue, private consumption, households’ savings and money 277
supply will also change and these changes will be some multiple of ∆G. Hence, we can 278
say that government transfer has a multiplier effect on the aforesaid four macroeconomic 279
variables and in this section we will provide the formal definitions of different kinds of 280
multipliers for the purpose of precise empirical estimations. 281
• Tax multiplier for government transfer (TM): If the government transfer is 282
changed by an amount ∆G then a portion of ∆G will return to the government 283
in the form of taxes. If the changes in tax revenue brought about by ∆G change 284
in government transfer is given by ∆T then the corresponding tax multiplier for 285
government transfer can be written as follows: 286
TM =
∆T
∆G
• Consumption multiplier for government transfer (CM): When government 287
transfer changes by an amount ∆G then private consumption is also supposed 288
to change as a by-product. This stems from the fact that the beneficiaries of 289
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government transfer program will spend a part of their endowment in consumption. 290
If the changes in consumption brought about by ∆G change in government transfer 291
is given by ∆C then consumption multiplier for government transfer can be defined 292
by the following: 293
CM =
∆C
∆G
• Savings multiplier for government spending (SM): Changes in government 294
transfer will induce savings into the economy. It is because the beneficiaries of 295
government transfer program will consume a portion of it while the rest will 296
be saved. If the changes in households’ savings in response to ∆G changes in 297
government transfer are given by ∆S then savings multiplier for government 298
transfer is given by: 299
SM =
∆S
∆G
• Money supply multiplier for government spending (MSM): We have 300
discussed previously that a change in government transfer may induce successive 301
savings and consumption in the economy. As the savings increases so does the 302
money supply. If the changes in money supply due to ∆G changes in government 303
transfer is given by ∆MS then the corresponding money supply multiplier is given 304
by the following construct: 305
MSM =
∆MS
∆G
In the preceding portion we have defined the multipliers on period by period basis 306
and these are known as impact multipliers. However, the impact of changes in 307
government transfer may not remain confined only in the period it is applied. 308
Rather its effect may be pronounced over subsequent time periods and considering 309
this we can define a cumulative version of the above four multipliers over an 310
n-period long time horizon as follows: 311
TM =
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆Ti
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆Gi
CM =
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆Ci
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆Gi
SM =
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆Si
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆Gi
MSM =
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆MSi
∑n
i=1(i+ d)
−i ×∆Gi
where d is the discounting rate which is used to appropriately discount the future 312
responses. Above set of multipliers which captures the dynamic impact of initial 313
government transfers and subsidies on tax, consumption, savings and money supply 314
over an n-period long time horizon are termed as the cumulative multipliers. 315
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5 Methodology 316
Here, we are interested to estimate how tax revenue, private consumption, gross savings
and money supply respond to a unit change in government transfer. In the existing
literature, the responsiveness of one variable to changes in another is usually estimated
through impulse response analysis under structural VAR framework. See for example,
Fatas and Mihov (2001) [11], Blanchard and Perotti (2002) [4], Mountford and Uhlig
(2009) [23], Burriel et al (2010) [7], Ilzetzki et al (2013) [18] etcetera. The literature cited
above broadly attempted to measure the extent of changes in GDP brought about by a
unit change in different fiscal variables (government expenditure in many different forms
and/or tax revenue) by building a structural VAR model comprising GDP, intended
fiscal variables and other controlling variables including but not limited to real interest
rate, real effective exchange rate etcetera. In our context, we build a structural VAR
model with government transfer, tax revenue, private consumption, gross savings and
money supply as endogenous variables and perform impulse response analysis on this
framework. Following Ilzetzki et al (2013) [18] our structural VAR model takes the
following form:
AYn,t =
k
∑
i=1
Ci × Yn,t−i +Bun,t
where Yn,t is the vector of government transfer, tax revenue, private consumption, gross 317
savings and money supply of country n at time t, Ci, ∀1≤i≤k is the matrix of coefficients 318
of the lagged terms of Yn,t, B is a diagonal matrix and un,t is orthogonal identically 319
distributed shocks in endogenous variables such that E(un,t) = 0 and E(un,tu
′
n,t) is an 320
identity matrix. Finally, matrix A accounts for the contemporaneous interactions among 321
the endogenous variables and is assumed to be a lower triangular matrix. Moreover, the 322
variable k is the optimum lag length for our structural VAR model which is empirically 323
selected using different information criteria. To build a VAR model and to perform 324
impulse response analysis on it the following step by step procedure is followed. 325
• Our analysis begins with the determination of the optimum lag length k for the 326
endogenous variables under VAR framework. Lag lengths that minimize different 327
information criteria are noted. Here, we report the optimum lag lengths suggested by 328
Likelihood Ratio (LR), Final Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike Information Criterion 329
(AIC), Schwartz Criteria (SC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). Finally, 330
the lag length suggested by the majority of the above information criteria is used as k 331
for the structural VAR model to be constructed. 332
• Time series data often suffer from heteroskedasticity and a convenient way out of this 333
problem is to convert them into their logarithmic form. In fact, log transformation is 334
a commonly used practice in the empirical literatures of estimating different kinds of 335
multipliers see for example Ilzetzki et al (2013) [18], Gonzalez-Garcia et al (2013) [16] 336
among others. Following the footsteps of the vast empirical literature we also log- 337
transform our variables before fitting them into VAR. 338
• VAR methodology requires each of the endogenous variables included into the system 339
to be stationary. So, the first step to be followed in this regard is to determine the 340
order of integration of all the endogenous variables namely government transfer, tax 341
revenue, private consumption, gross savings and money supply. As we use panel data 342
in our analysis a number of panel unit root testing procedures are used to determine 343
the order of integration of the underlying time series. Tests we use here include 344
Levin-Lin-Chu test, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-statistic test, ADF - Fisher Chi-square 345
and PP - Fisher Chi-square test. When different testing methods provide conflicting 346
results regarding the order of integration of the underlying time series then we rely on 347
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the order suggested by the majority of the tests. After the orders of integration of the 348
variables are determined the variables are appropriately differenced before being fed 349
into the VAR framework. 350
• To identify shocks in the endogenous variables we follow recursive formulation approach 351
(Cholesky Decomposition) proposed by Sims (1980) [27]. In this approach ordering of 352
the variables plays a crucial role: variables appearing later in the VAR representations 353
respond contemporaneously to any change in the variables appearing earlier but not 354
the vice versa. In fact, to model this restriction the matrix A in the initial VAR 355
definition is assumed to be a lower triangular matrix. Ordering of the variables in our 356
context is assumed to be government transfer, tax revenue, private consumption, gross 357
savings and money supply. This implies that tax revenue, private consumption, gross 358
savings and money supply respond contemporaneously to any change in government 359
transfer but not the vice versa. Similarly, private consumption, gross savings and 360
money supply respond contemporaneously to any change in government tax revenue; 361
gross savings and money supply respond contemporaneously to any change in private 362
consumption and money supply respond contemporaneously to any change in gross 363
savings but not the vice versa. By ordering the variables in this manner we assume 364
a transmission channel amongst the variables in which an impulse in government 365
transfer is immediately reflected to government tax collection which effects private 366
consumption which in turn influences gross savings and which eventually gets reflected 367
into money supply. The transmission channel thus described is quite obvious provided 368
that the government does not intend to run a structural fiscal deficit and plunge into 369
debt as a by-product. 370
• Once the ordering of the variables is set we provide one standard deviation Cholesky 371
shock in government transfer and note down the impact and cumulative responses 372
of tax revenue, private consumption, gross savings and money supply. Moreover, 373
the impact and cumulative response of government transfer to its own shock are 374
also noted. However, the cumulative responses thus noted directly from the impulse 375
response analysis need to be discounted by the corresponding risk free rate. As we use 376
panel data the median interest rate of government treasuries is used to discount the 377
cumulative responses. We then divide the impact response (discounted cumulative 378
response) of tax revenue, private consumption, gross savings and money supply by the 379
impact response (discounted cumulative response) of government transfer to estimate 380
the desired multiplier values. 381
• As we use log-transformation of our endogenous variables, multiplier values estimated 382
directly from the impulse response analysis also happen to have the same logarithmic 383
unit. So, instead of being the true multipliers what we calculate in the previous steps 384
are essentially the elasticity of the four endogenous variables namely tax revenue, 385
private consumption, gross savings and money supply with respect to government 386
transfer. To get back the multipliers in their original multiplier unit we need to 387
divide each of the multipliers calculated in the above manner by the average value of 388
government transfer to respective endogenous variable ratio for the whole sampling 389
data [16]. 390
6 Data 391
We collect annual time series data of government subsidies and other transfer (% expense), 392
total government expenditure (%GDP), GDP (current USD), tax revenue (%GDP), final 393
consumption expenditure (%GDP), final consumption expenditure of the government 394
(%GDP), gross savings (%GDP) and money supply (%GDP) from World Bank Open 395
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Data [32] of some 10 (ten) OECD countries during 1990-2017. Countries included in the 396
analysis are Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Korea, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, 397
United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US). Countries are chosen depending upon the 398
availability of the required data. Moreover, to get private consumption expenditure we 399
subtract government final consumption expenditure from total consumption expenditure. 400
Once all the data are gathered we determine the orders of integration of all the time 401
series data by using Levin-Lin-Chu test, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-statistic test, ADF - 402
Fisher Chi-square and PP - Fisher Chi-square test. The results of panel unit root testing 403
are presented in Tables: 1 and 2. From these tables it is evident that all the series are 404
non-stationary at level and stationary at first differenced form. As all the series are I(1) 405
process we take first difference of each series before fitting them into VAR model. 406
In the next step, we determine the appropriate lag length for the endogenous variables 407
in our structural VAR model. The lag lengths suggested by different information criteria 408
are depicted in Table: 3. From Table: 3 it can be seen that LR criteria suggests 05 (five) 409
lags while FPE and AIC suggest 02(two) lags instead. Moreover, SC and HQ criteria 410
suggest 01 (one) lag for our endogenous variables. Here, we choose 02 (two) lags as it is 411
suggested by both FPE and AIC. 412
We then build a VAR model by taking all of our endogenous variables in logged 413
first differenced form with 02 (two) lagged terms and provide one standard deviation 414
Cholesky shock in government transfer. Both the impact and cumulative responses of tax 415
revenue, private consumption, gross savings and money supply to shocks in government 416
transfer are noted. Responses of government transfer to its own shock are also noted. 417
Impact and cumulative responses of tax revenue, private consumption, gross savings, 418
money supply and government transfer to shocks in government transfer are graphically 419
represented in Figs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively. 420
Figs: 1 and 2 present the impact and cumulative responses of tax revenue to 421
government transfer. From these figures it is evident that governments’ collection of 422
tax revenue responds positively to transfers which means when the government transfer 423
increases so does the taxes. This is essentially due the fact that the governments across 424
the globe are reluctant to run a structural fiscal deficit and rather wish to meet up 425
their expenses from revenues. For the first few periods the response of tax revenue to 426
shocks in government transfer is positive although it gradually diminishes to zero. This 427
diminishing response of tax revenue to shocks in transfer can be easily anticipated as 428
we use the variables in their stationary (first differenced) form. Hence all the shocks 429
are eventually absorbed and the system goes back to equilibrium after some initial 430
jittering. After the responses are noted now we can estimate the corresponding tax 431
multiplier values. The impact and cumulative government tax multipliers are tabulated 432
in column 11 and column 12 of Table: 4. From Table: 4 it can be seen that the impact 433
multipliers vary between −0.84 to 0.78 in different time periods. Although the impact 434
multiplier moves to and fro between positive and negative values and thus giving no clear 435
indication regarding the inter-relation between government transfer and tax revenue 436
the cumulative multiplier smoothes out the jittering quite nicely and shows all through 437
positive values: Small opposite movements of transfers and taxes are heavily offsetted 438
by the large persistent positive co-movements of the two. Moreover, the values of the 439
cumulative multipliers are also very consistent moving in between 0.43 to 0.53 in different 440
time periods. 441
Next we are set to identify the impact of government transfer on private consumption. 442
Intuitively we can assume that private consumption should respond positively to any 443
influx of government transfers and subsidies. When the households receive an extra 444
endowment from the government they tend to spend more on consumption. This intuitive 445
idea is entertained quite nicely by the empirical findings as can be seen from Figs: 3 446
and 4. Figs: 3 and 4 show the impact and cumulative response of private consumption 447
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to one standard deviation Cholesky shock in government transfer. From these figures 448
it is evident that the impact response of private consumption to shocks in government 449
transfer is roughly positive although sometimes it swings between positive and negative 450
values. However, these negative responses are quite small in magnitude and the overall 451
response of private consumption to transfer shock is positive as anticipated (as can be 452
seen from the cumulative responses in Fig: 4). Once we have estimated the impact and 453
cumulative responses of private consumption we can then calculate the corresponding 454
multiplier values. Multiplier values are tabulated in column 11 and column 12 of Table: 455
5. From column 11 of Table: 5 it is evident that the impact multipliers are rather 456
inconsistent in this case and move between −4.45 to 4.17. Negative responses of private 457
consumptions are obtained during the later periods of the forecasting horizon and are 458
convincingly absorbed by the large persistent positive responses obtained during the first 459
few periods of the analysis. And hence the cumulative multipliers show persistent large 460
positive values all over the period as expected. From column 12 of Table: 5 we can see 461
that the cumulative multiplier vary between 2.22 to 2.46 which is consistently positive. 462
Impact and cumulative response of gross savings with respect to a unit shock in 463
government transfer are presented in Figs: 5 and 6. From these figures it is evident 464
that gross savings responds positively to any increase in government transfer and the 465
impact response is positive in most of the periods after the shock is applied. Although 466
during period 7 and 8 the impact response temporarily goes negative the magnitudes 467
of these negative responses are quite low and they are easily offsetted by the earlier 468
positive responses. Numeric results of the impulse response analysis of gross savings 469
under VAR are depicted in Table: 6. From column 11 of Table: 6 it can be seen that the 470
impact multipliers are mostly positive except for period 7 and period 8. Although the 471
impact multipliers are negative during these periods these negative responses are small, 472
non-persistent and rather transitory in nature as they seem to become positive right 473
after period 8. However, the cumulative multipliers are positive throughout the analysis 474
as can be seen from column 12 of Table: 6. This implies that the negative responses of 475
gross savings to changes in government transfer at period 7 and 8 are properly accounted 476
for by the large persistent positive responses. From column 12 of Table: 6 it can be seen 477
that the cumulative multipliers vary rather consistently between 0.71 to 0.79 in different 478
time periods. 479
Last but not the least we will analyze the responses of money supply to changes in 480
government transfer. From Figs: 7 and 8 it can be seen that unlike the responses of other 481
endogenous variables the responses of money supply to changes in government transfer 482
are always positive from period 1 to period 10. While the responses of tax revenue, 483
private consumption and gross savings to changes in government transfer temporarily 484
have small negative values, the responses of money supply are solely positive throughout 485
the forecasting horizon which reinforces the claim made in this article. As can be seen 486
from column 11 of Table: 7 that the impact multipliers vary between 1.50 to as high 487
as 6.52 in different time periods. Although, the impact multipliers vary drastically in 488
magnitude the cumulative multipliers are rather consistent in nature and vary within 489
the short range of 2.90 to 3.35. 490
After we are done with the impulse response analysis we carry out variance decompo- 491
sition of different endogenous variables in the system to explore how much of the variance 492
in one variable is attributed to others. Table: 8 presents the variance decomposition 493
of government tax revenue in terms of government transfer, private consumption, gross 494
savings and money supply. From this table it is evident that 25.24% of the variance 495
in tax revenue is due to government transfers and subsidies at period 1. The stake 496
of government transfer in the variance of tax revenue slightly decreases after period 1 497
and reaches 22.39% at period 10. Still transfers and subsidies are the very significant 498
endogenous variables in the system to explain variance in government tax revenue only 499
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next to tax revenue itself. 500
Variance decomposition of private consumption in terms of other variables are depicted 501
in Table: 9. It can be seen from Table: 9 that 39.56% variance in private consumption is 502
due to government transfer itself making it the single most important contributor to the 503
variance in private consumption. Moreover, contribution of government transfer to the 504
variance in private consumption slightly decreases afterwards reaching 36.80% at period 505
10. Still at period 10 the contribution of government transfer in explaining variances in 506
private consumption is greater than that of any other variables in the system. 507
In the penultimate step we analyze the variance decomposition of gross savings in 508
terms of other variables. It can be seen from Table: 10 that 14.93% of the variance in 509
gross savings is due to government transfer at period 1 while at period 10 it contributes 510
to nearly 13.94%. Thus the role of government transfer in explaining variance in gross 511
savings is quite substantial only next to tax revenue and gross savings itself and clearly 512
ahead of private consumption and money supply. 513
Finally, we analyze the variance decomposition of money supply in terms of gov- 514
ernment transfer, tax revenue, private consumption and gross savings. The results are 515
presented in Table: 11. From Table: 11 it is evident that the contribution of government 516
transfer to the variance in money supply is 29.04% at period 1 while tax revenue, private 517
consumption, gross savings and money supply itself contribute to 17.73%, 17.85%, 0.96% 518
and 34.42% respectively. Thus the contribution of government transfer in explaining 519
variance in money supply is quite significant and only next to money supply itself. 520
Government transfer retains its position as an important contributor to the variance in 521
money supply throughout the forecasting horizon reaching 27.04% at period 10. 522
7 Discussion 523
It can be argued that the government transfers can only have a redistributive impact 524
on the money supply, i.e., money transferred by the government to the households, 525
was, in the first place, collected from the households as direct and indirect taxes and 526
thus it has no net impact on the overall money supply. However, it is to be noted in 527
this regard, the government collects money as taxes from the affluent segments of the 528
economy and spends it for or transfers it to the relatively impoverished segments and 529
these two segments do not necessarily have the same marginal propensity to consume. 530
Some studies have even estimated that, for low income households, marginal propensity 531
to consume can be as much as 10 times of their wealthy peers [12]. Thus the money 532
transferred to them as subsidy is supposed to be spent mostly on consumption and thus 533
it (the money) gets recirculated into the economy again and again through successive 534
consumptions and savings which enhances the broad money supply in the process in 535
such a way as discussed earlier in this article. On the contrary, studies suggest that 536
the affluent segments of the economy usually have a higher savings rate and, not to 537
mention, have a relatively higher marginal propensity to save [10], [15], i.e., money is 538
ultimately clogged into the rich peoples’ wallet away from the real economic activity. 539
Thus the government’s collection of revenue from the affluent segments and distribution 540
of the same to the poor as subsidy rejuvenate the economy by infusing new economic 541
activities. Apart from having only a redistributive role, it is supposed to enhance the 542
equilibrium output by uplifting aggregate demand, i.e., more and more goods will be 543
produced and sold in the market as the poor gets (some) purchasing power which (the 544
newly produced goods) would otherwise be stored in the inventory as unsold or may not 545
even get produced in the first place. As economic activities are boosted and more goods 546
are produced and sold in the market, more and more money is required to transact such 547
goods which brings in previously clogged money into the market as a by-product. As 548
the initial economic cycle through purchase (for consumption) is started, many more 549
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follow as an eventual consequence. 550
Moreover, government nowadays does not need to run a balanced budget which means 551
the government can spend virtually as much as they wish to meet up their social and 552
political agenda, which implies that the government transfer program (along with any 553
other government expenditure spree) is not necessarily backed by the revenue collection 554
as most of the countries these days operate under deficit financing schemes and often 555
opt to spend more money than they can actually collect through taxations and run 556
on an ever-lasting budget deficit [24]. To make things even worse, the governments 557
throughout world can simply print money at their will for pursuing social and political 558
agenda as the currencies now are only fiat currencies with no intrinsic value within. 559
Modern history of fiat currency can be traced back to 1971, when, Richard Nixon, 37th 560
president of the United States of America, unilaterally took United States away from 561
the covenants of the Bretton-Woods and stopped the convertibility of US dollar to gold 562
to the shock of the rest of the world. This historical incident, popularly known as Nixon 563
Shock, gives the sovereign governments across the globe an unlimited freedom to print 564
money at their whim, i.e., the governments no longer need golds, silver or any other 565
valuables to back their currency in circulation. Aside from this, countries no longer need 566
US dollars to back up their currency and US dollar no longer ensures convertibility to 567
a pre-fixed amount of gold at Federal Reserve fully defying the Bretton-Woods pacts. 568
As an obvious consequence of the Nixon Shock, the governments around the world can 569
now arbitrarily spend any amount of money on transfer programs regardless of what 570
they can actually earn through taxation. Such transfers happen to perform a greater 571
role than simply redistribution of wealth inside the economy: This extra money beyond 572
the means (of the government) can stimulate economic activity (by uplifting AD curve), 573
enhance money supply (in a way described earlier), serve social and political agendas of 574
the government like welfare state, warfare etcetera (by printing more fiat currencies as 575
and when necessary) and, through these, may act as a catalyst to raise GDP (as AD 576
soars) and general price level (according to quantity theory of money as money stock is 577
inflated) as well. Here, in this study, we investigate the role of the government transfer 578
program on money supply considering the transfer amount to some extent exogenous to 579
revenue collection as there are many sources for governments to facilitate such transfers 580
apart from general taxation reveue, e.g., deficit financing through borrowing and printing 581
money as and when necessary. 582
8 Conclusion 583
Government collects money from the rich and spends it for public goods and provides 584
subsidy to the poor from the fund. In simple term, government’s action of collecting 585
taxes and providing subsidies is simply redistributive in nature. However, it is only 586
redistributive when the government runs a balanced budget or it runs a temporary 587
structural deficit to combat business cycles with the intention to fill up the gap during 588
economic boom which is not the case in reality. Moreover, for the government program 589
of taxation and transfer to have no effect on money supply, both the taxed and transferee 590
(one who receives transfer payments) segments must happen to have the same marginal 591
propensity to consume. But, as we discussed earlier, the marginal propensities to 592
consume of the two segments vary drastically along the income line where the poorer 593
segments tend to have a marginal propensity as much as 10 times higher than their 594
affluent peers [12]. So, when the impoverished segments receive transfer payments, 595
they spend almost all of it in consumption and trigger new series of economic cycles. 596
Ultimately, aggregate demand curve is shifted upward and so is the output (due to a 597
raised AD curve). As output is enhanced, more and more money is required to purchase 598
the goods and services and money comes into circulation from government’s coffer 599
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to the poorer’s pocket. These newly entered money will then be amplified through 600
successive consumptions and savings by the multiplier process. In essence of the above 601
discussion, here, we argue that the monetary policy, i.e., determining short term interest 602
rate by manipulating money supply, is not the monopoly of the monetary authority 603
alone. Rather, the fiscal policy, through transfer program, can play a significant role in 604
the determination of the overall supply of money and thereby inevitably influences the 605
short term interest rate. For example, when the government increases its expenditure 606
through transfers and subsidies, disposable income of impoverished segment increases as 607
a by-product. A portion of this enhanced income will then be spent in consumption while 608
another portion will be saved. The saved portion of disposable income will create more 609
money into the economy through the process of fractional reserve banking. On the other 610
hand, the amount of money spent in consumption will be the income for another entity 611
inside the economy. The entity receiving the money will then save a portion of it while 612
the rest will be consumed and the process continues. Here, we investigate the algebraic 613
structure through which government transfer and money supply are inter-related. Our 614
empirical estimation here also suggests a positive inter-relation between the two variables 615
and hence changing government transfer will also bring about a significant change in 616
money supply due the presence of multiplier effect. On the contrary, if the government 617
chooses not to impose taxes on the riches, the idle money would be simply stored into 618
people’s wallets or bank accounts and may be mostly left unused apart from the fact that 619
a portion of this idle money will be invested by the banks (this portion will be defined by 620
the law of the land, availability of good customers, bank’s limit for investment and risk 621
taking and the overall business scenario after the fulfilment of cash reserve requirements 622
as imposed by the monetary authority) while the rest would serve no economic purposes. 623
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9 Figures
Fig 1. Impact response of tax
revenue to shocks in government
transfer
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Fig 2. Cumulative response of tax
revenue to shocks in government
transfer
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Fig 3. Impact response of private
consumption to shocks in
government transfer
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Fig 4. Cumulative response of
private consumption to shocks in
government transfer
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Fig 5. Impact response of gross
savings to shocks in government
transfer
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Fig 6. Cumulative response of gross
savings to shocks in government
transfer
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Fig 7. Impact response of money
supply to shocks in government
transfer
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of D(LN_M O NEY_SUPPLY) to D(LN_TRANSFER)
Response to Cholesky O ne S.D. Innovations – 2 S.E.
Fig 8. Cumulative response of money
supply to shocks in government
transfer
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Fig 9. Impact response of
government transfer to its own shock
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Fig 10. Cumulative response of
government transfer to its own shock
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accum ulated Response of D(LN_TRANSFER) to D(LN_TRANSFER)
Accum ulated Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations – 2 S.E.
August 11, 2021 20/30
10 Tables
Table 1. ADF unit root test
Series Year Test Test variant Lag length selection L/FD Statistic p-value Remark
Government Transfer 1990-2017 Levin-Lin-Chu individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L -1.33004 0.0918 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -9.02573 0 S
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 1.84668 0.9676 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -8.50311 0 S
ADF - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 7.95451 0.9922 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 103.443 0 S
PP - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 9.01669 0.9827 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 102.992 0 S
Tax Revenue 1990-2017 Levin-Lin-Chu individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L -0.56005 0.2877 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -10.517 0 S
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 2.32875 0.9901 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -10.1116 0 S
ADF - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 5.8121 0.9991 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 126.491 0 S
PP - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 5.56152 0.9994 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 145.562 0 S
Private Consumption 1990-2017 Levin-Lin-Chu individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L -2.97387 0.0015 S
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -9.10618 0 S
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 1.53747 0.9379 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -8.24491 0 S
ADF - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 10.8726 0.9495 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 101.156 0 S
PP - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 9.71919 0.973 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 108.203 0 S
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Table 2. ADF unit root test
Series Year Test Test variant Lag length selection L/FD Statistic p-value Remark
Gross Savings 1990-2017 Levin-Lin-Chu individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L -0.41475 0.3392 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -9.51082 0 S
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 2.05881 0.9802 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -9.39402 0 S
ADF - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 6.44389 0.9981 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 117.426 0 S
PP - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 5.98589 0.9989 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 127.029 0 S
Money Supply 1990-2017 Levin-Lin-Chu individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 0.1157 0.5461 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -8.12898 0 S
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 3.52336 0.9998 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD -7.48621 0 S
ADF - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 3.73515 1 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 90.0341 0 S
PP - Fisher Chi-square individual intercept Schawrz Info Criterion L 3.8866 1 NS
Schawrz Info Criterion FD 89.4624 0 S
Table 3. Lag length selection criteria
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -873.2667 NA 0.004486 8.782667 8.865125 8.816036
1 946.5092 3530.365 7.20E-11 -9.165092 -8.670344* -8.964875*
2 983.8671 70.60642 6.37e-11* -9.288671* -8.381633 -8.921607
3 1008.049 44.49406 6.43E-11 -9.280486 -7.961159 -8.746575
4 1025.376 31.01578 6.95E-11 -9.203759 -7.472142 -8.503
5 1041.587 28.20796 7.62E-11 -9.115873 -6.971967 -8.248267
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Table 4. Calculation of tax revenue multiplier
Period Impact
responsse
of tax
revenue
Impact
response of
government
transfer
Impact
Multiplier
Cumulative
responsse of
tax revenue
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Discounted
cumulative
response of
tax revenue
Discounted
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Cumulative
multiplier
Transfer
to tax
revenue
ratio
Adjusted
impact
multiplier
Adjusted
cumu-
lative
multiplier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1 0.067411 0.124906 0.54 0.067411 0.124906 0.067411 0.124906 0.54 0.51 0.51
2 0.0128 0.017642 0.73 0.080211 0.142548 0.079346 0.14101098 0.56 0.68 0.53
3 -0.007886 0.009238 -0.85 0.072325 0.151786 0.070774 0.148530391 0.48 -0.80 0.45
4 0.000439 0.005328 0.08 0.072764 0.157114 0.070436 0.152086371 0.46 0.08 0.43
5 0.002908 0.00376 0.77 0.075672 0.160874 0.072461 0.154046939 0.47 1.06499511 0.73 0.44
6 0.000528 0.001382 0.38 0.076200 0.162256 0.072180 0.153695015 0.47 0.36 0.44
7 -0.000256 0.000287 -0.89 0.075944 0.162543 0.071161 0.152306729 0.47 -0.84 0.44
8 -0.000111 0.000227 -0.49 0.075833 0.162770 0.070291 0.150874897 0.47 -0.46 0.44
9 9.99E-05 0.00012 0.83 0.075933 0.162890 0.069625 0.149358124 0.47 0.78 0.44
10 3.57E-05 5.97E-05 0.60 0.075969 0.162950 0.068907 0.147801825 0.47 0.56 0.44
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Table 5. Calculation of private consumption multiplier
Period Impact
responsse
of con-
sumption
Impact
response of
government
transfer
Impact
Multiplier
Cumulative
responsse
of consump-
tion
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Discounted
cumulative
response of
consump-
tion
Discounted
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Cumulative
multiplier
Transfer
to con-
sumption
ratio
Adjusted
impact
multiplier
Adjusted
cumu-
lative
multiplier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1 0.064312 0.124906 0.51 0.064312 0.124906 0.064312 0.124906 0.51 2.22 2.22
2 0.017073 0.017642 0.97 0.081385 0.142548 0.080507 0.14101098 0.57 4.17 2.46
3 -0.007241 0.009238 -0.78 0.074144 0.151786 0.072554 0.148530391 0.49 -3.38 2.11
4 -0.000246 0.005328 -0.05 0.073898 0.157114 0.071533 0.152086371 0.47 -0.20 2.03
5 0.002058 0.00376 0.55 0.075956 0.160874 0.072733 0.154046939 0.47 0.231857807 2.36 2.04
6 0.000566 0.001382 0.41 0.076522 0.162256 0.072485 0.153695015 0.47 1.77 2.03
7 -0.000296 0.000287 -1.03 0.076226 0.162543 0.071426 0.152306729 0.47 -4.45 2.02
8 -0.000102 0.000227 -0.45 0.076124 0.162770 0.070561 0.150874897 0.47 -1.94 2.02
9 5.52E-05 0.00012 0.46 0.076179 0.162890 0.069851 0.149358124 0.47 1.98 2.02
10 2.92E-05 5.97E-05 0.49 0.076208 0.162950 0.069124 0.147801825 0.47 2.11 2.02
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Table 6. Calculation of gross savings multiplier
Period Impact re-
sponsse of
gross sav-
ings
Impact
response of
government
transfer
Impact
Multiplier
Cumulative
responsse
of gross
savings
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Discounted
cumulative
response of
savings
Discounted
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Cumulative
multiplier
Transfer
to savings
ratio
Adjusted
impact
multiplier
Adjusted
cumu-
lative
multiplier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1 0.074101 0.124906 0.59 0.074101 0.124906 0.074101 0.124906 0.59 0.79 0.79
2 0.004726 0.017642 0.27 0.078827 0.142548 0.077977 0.14101098 0.55 0.36 0.74
3 0.004236 0.009238 0.46 0.083063 0.151786 0.081281 0.148530391 0.55 0.61 0.73
4 0.001997 0.005328 0.37 0.085060 0.157114 0.082338 0.152086371 0.54 0.50 0.72
5 0.001087 0.00376 0.29 0.086147 0.160874 0.082491 0.154046939 0.54 0.747929075 0.39 0.72
6 0.000773 0.001382 0.56 0.086920 0.162256 0.082334 0.153695015 0.54 0.75 0.72
7 -0.000404 0.000287 -1.41 0.086516 0.162543 0.081068 0.152306729 0.53 -1.88 0.71
8 -2.46E-05 0.000227 -0.11 0.086491 0.162770 0.080171 0.150874897 0.53 -0.14 0.71
9 3.63E-05 0.00012 0.30 0.086528 0.162890 0.079340 0.149358124 0.53 0.40 0.71
10 2.07E-05 5.97E-05 0.35 0.086548 0.162950 0.078503 0.147801825 0.53 0.46 0.71
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Table 7. Calculation of money supply multiplier
Period Impact
responsse
of money
supply
Impact
response of
government
transfer
Impact
Multiplier
Cumulative
responsse
of money
supply
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Discounted
cumulative
response
of money
supply
Discounted
Cumulative
response of
government
transfer
Cumulative
multiplier
Transfer
to money
supply
ratio
Adjusted
impact
multiplier
Adjusted
cumu-
lative
multiplier
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1 0.062334 0.124906 0.50 0.062334 0.124906 0.062334 0.124906 0.50 2.90 2.90
2 0.019788 0.017642 1.12 0.082122 0.142548 0.081237 0.14101098 0.58 6.52 3.35
3 0.002375 0.009238 0.26 0.084497 0.151786 0.082685 0.148530391 0.56 1.50 3.24
4 0.001507 0.005328 0.28 0.086004 0.157114 0.083252 0.152086371 0.55 1.64 3.18
5 0.003065 0.00376 0.82 0.089069 0.160874 0.085289 0.154046939 0.55 0.17194368 4.74 3.22
6 0.001135 0.001382 0.82 0.090204 0.162256 0.085445 0.153695015 0.56 4.78 3.23
7 9.50E-05 0.000287 0.33 0.090299 0.162543 0.084612 0.152306729 0.56 1.93 3.23
8 6.53E-05 0.000227 0.29 0.090364 0.162770 0.083761 0.150874897 0.56 1.67 3.23
9 6.61E-05 0.00012 0.55 0.090430 0.162890 0.082918 0.149358124 0.56 3.20 3.23
10 5.51E-05 5.97E-05 0.92 0.090486 0.162950 0.082074 0.147801825 0.56 5.37 3.23
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Table 8. Variance decomposition of tax revenue
Period S.E. Transfer Tax Revenue Private Con-
sumption
Gross Savings Money Supply
1 0.134183 25.24 74.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.143309 22.92 66.55 1.60 5.90 3.03
3 0.145408 22.56 66.83 1.93 5.73 2.94
4 0.146004 22.38 66.68 1.92 5.74 3.28
5 0.146069 22.40 66.66 1.92 5.75 3.28
6 0.146088 22.39 66.66 1.92 5.75 3.28
7 0.146091 22.39 66.66 1.92 5.75 3.28
8 0.146092 22.39 66.66 1.92 5.75 3.28
9 0.146092 22.39 66.66 1.92 5.75 3.28
10 0.146092 22.39 66.66 1.92 5.75 3.28
Table 9. Variance decomposition of private consumption
Period S.E. Transfer Tax Revenue Private Con-
sumption
Gross Savings Money Supply
1 0.102251 39.56 32.08 28.36 0.00 0.00
2 0.108099 37.89 30.66 25.94 2.93 2.57
3 0.10978 37.17 32.00 25.18 3.15 2.50
4 0.110319 36.81 32.26 24.96 3.23 2.74
5 0.110372 36.81 32.25 24.94 3.24 2.76
6 0.110391 36.80 32.26 24.93 3.25 2.76
7 0.110392 36.80 32.26 24.93 3.25 2.76
8 0.110393 36.80 32.26 24.93 3.25 2.76
9 0.110393 36.80 32.26 24.93 3.25 2.76
10 0.110393 36.80 32.26 24.93 3.25 2.76
Table 10. Variance decomposition of gross savings
Period S.E. Transfer Tax Revenue Private Con-
sumption
Gross Savings Money Supply
1 0.19175 14.93 23.15 1.85 60.07 0.00
2 0.19419 14.62 22.78 2.55 58.67 1.37
3 0.198909 13.98 23.85 2.44 56.02 3.70
4 0.199244 13.94 23.99 2.46 55.91 3.70
5 0.199315 13.94 23.98 2.46 55.88 3.74
6 0.199332 13.94 23.98 2.47 55.87 3.74
7 0.199334 13.94 23.98 2.47 55.87 3.74
8 0.199335 13.94 23.98 2.47 55.87 3.74
9 0.199335 13.94 23.98 2.47 55.87 3.74
10 0.199335 13.94 23.98 2.47 55.87 3.74
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Table 11. Variance decomposition of money supply
Period S.E. Transfer Tax Revenue Private Con-
sumption
Gross Savings Money Supply
1 0.115674 29.04 17.73 17.85 0.96 34.42
2 0.123482 28.05 20.00 16.29 2.16 33.51
3 0.125736 27.09 20.15 16.31 2.99 33.46
4 0.125959 27.01 20.30 16.29 3.05 33.35
5 0.126026 27.04 20.28 16.30 3.05 33.32
6 0.126042 27.04 20.28 16.30 3.05 33.33
7 0.126044 27.04 20.28 16.30 3.05 33.33
8 0.126044 27.04 20.28 16.30 3.05 33.33
9 0.126044 27.04 20.28 16.30 3.05 33.33
10 0.126044 27.04 20.28 16.30 3.05 33.33
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